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Abstract Outcome monitoring is crucial for subsequent
adjustments in behavior and is associated with a specific
electrophysiological response, the feedback-related negativ-
ity (FRN). Besides feedback generated by one’s own action,
the performance of others may also be relevant for oneself,
and the observation of outcomes for others’ actions elicits an
observer FRN (oFRN). To test how these components are
influenced by social setting and predictive value of feedback
information, we compared event-related potentials, as well
as their topographies and neural generators, for performance
feedback generated by oneself and others in a cooperative
versus competitive context. Our results show that (1) the
predictive relevance of outcomes is crucial to elicit an FRN
in both players and observers, (2) cooperation increases
FRN and P300 amplitudes, especially in individuals with
high traits of perspective taking, and (3) contrary to previous
findings on gambling outcomes, oFRN components are
generated for both cooperating and competing observers,
but with smaller amplitudes in the latter. Neural source
estimation revealed medial prefrontal activity for both
FRN and oFRN, but with additional generators for the
oFRN in the dorsolateral and ventral prefrontal cortex, as
well as the temporoparietal junction. We conclude that the
latter set of brain regions could mediate social influences on
action monitoring by representing agency and social rele-
vance of outcomes and are, therefore, recruited in addition
to shared prediction error signals generated in medial frontal
areas during action outcome observation.
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Introduction
Monitoring one’s own performance is fundamental for suc-
cessful adjustments in behavior and for learning and guidance
of future actions (Rabbitt, 1966). In the presence of other
people, monitoring one’s own actions might be even more
salient (Festinger, 1954): Imagine that you play tennis in a
doubles game and fail to catch a ball just given over by your
partner. Conversely, we also keep track of actions and their
consequences for other persons (e.g., our teammates or rivals),
especially when they are relevant for our own goals—for
example because we cooperate or compete with them.
According to the reinforcement learning theory (Holroyd
& Coles, 2002), action monitoring can be based either
directly on the internal representation of the action or on
external feedback information, which is usually available
sometime after action execution (Gentsch, Ullsperger, &
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Ullsperger, 2009; Heldmann, Rüsseler, & Münte, 2008;
Holroyd & Coles, 2002). Monitoring is mainly based on
internal representation of one’s own or observed motor
action, when the information about the correctness or goal
conduciveness of a given action is available already at the
time of or even before the onset of the motor response. On
the other hand, monitoring has to rely on external feedback
when there is no reliable internal knowledge about the
correctness or incorrectness at the time of action execution
(Bediou, Koban, Rosset, Pourtois, & Sander, 2012; Holroyd
&Coles, 2002).When both types of information are available,
later occurring external feedback might be redundant and low
in predictive relevance and, thus, not elicit a prediction error
signal (Heldmann et al., 2008; Holroyd & Coles, 2002).
Feedback on one’s own action signals the need for be-
havioral adjustment and heightened cognitive control, but it
is also associated with emotional or motivational signifi-
cance. Positive performance feedback is generally reward-
ing, whereas negative feedback elicits negative emotions
(Hajcak, Moser, Holroyd, & Simons, 2006). However, the
affective appraisal of feedback information might depend on
situational factors like social context: In comparison with
feedback given in private, receiving negative feedback in
the presence of other people may enhance its impact (Radke,
de Lange, Ullsperger, & de Bruijn, 2011), especially when
the other person is perceived as similar and close (Festinger,
1954) or when the relationship fosters interdependence or
reciprocity (Van Meel & Van Heijningen, 2010). Alterna-
tively, external feedback might become more relevant in a
competitive social context.
In the present study, we sought to clarify such influences
of social context on action monitoring by investigating brain
responses to feedback about self-performance versus others’
performance in cooperative, as opposed to competitive,
interpersonal settings. Our paradigm allowed us to disentan-
gle effects related to agency (self- vs other-generated
actions) from effects related to two types of personal signif-
icance by manipulating the predictive relevance (i.e., the
informative value or nonredundancy) of feedback informa-
tion and social context separately (for actions generated
either by oneself or by the other). Brain systems underlying
action monitoring generate early and rapid responses to
undesirable outcomes, characterized by typical event-related
potentials (ERPs) at the time of action execution: Already, 0–
100 ms after error commission, an error-related negativity
(ERN) occurs over frontocentral electrodes, followed by an
error positivity (Pe; see Falkenstein, Hohnsbein, Hoormann,
& Blanke, 1991; Gehring, Goss, Coles, Meyer, & Donchin,
1993), with putative sources in medial cortical regions, espe-
cially the anterior cingulate cortex (ACC; see Herrmann,
Römmler, Ehlis, Heidrich, & Fallgatter, 2004; O'Connell
et al., 2007; Van Veen & Carter, 2002; Vocat, Pourtois, &
Vuilleumier, 2008). Whereas the ERN reflects a generic and
automatic response to errors, the Pe may be related to higher-
order evaluative processing, posterror adjustments, and error
awareness (Falkenstein, Hoormann, Christ, & Hohnsbein,
2000; Overbeek, Nieuwenhuis, & Ridderinkhof, 2005).
The feedback-related negativity (FRN; also referred to as
medial frontal negativity, or MFN) is another negative com-
ponent in ERPs, arising 200–300 ms after the presentation
of negative, as compared with positive, outcome feedback.
It is time-locked to feedback cues, while the ERN is time-
locked to action execution. However, the FRN shows a
similar topographical distribution as the ERN and is thought
to have similar generators in the medial prefrontal cortex
(MPFC) and ACC (Gehring & Willoughby, 2002; Gentsch
et al., 2009; Miltner, Braun, & Coles, 1997). When external
information is redundant (i.e., low in predictive relevance),
because erroneous responses can easily be detected via
internal representations (thus eliciting an ERN), negative
feedback does not produce an FRN (Heldmann et al., 2008;
Holroyd & Coles, 2002), suggesting that both components
reflect a prediction error signal with common mechanisms
(Holroyd & Coles, 2002). Despite these commonalities,
ERN and FRN also differ in important features, especially in
terms of the source of information (internal vs. external) that is
used to compute a reward prediction error. Furthermore, while
the ERN is typically followed by the Pe, the FRN is some-
times followed by a P300-like positivity, although the latter is
inconstant and not fully understood. Similar to the Pe, this
P300 response might also be related to higher-order outcome
evaluation and affective significance of the feedback, since it
is sensitive to absolute reward magnitude (Yeung & Sanfey,
2004) and expectation (Bellebaum & Daum, 2008; Hajcak,
Holroyd, Moser, & Simons, 2005; Núñez Castellar, Kühn,
Fias, & Notebaert, 2010; Wu & Zhou, 2009).
Interestingly, the representation of others’ actions may
recruit partly similar processes as the representation of our
own actions (Jeannerod, 2001; Rizzolatti, Fogassi, & Gallese,
2001; Sebanz, Knoblich, & Prinz, 2003). Thus, observing
errors made by others also elicits a negative ERP, the observer
ERN (oERN), whose topography and sources resemble the
ERN, but with delayed latencies (Bates, Patel, & Liddle,
2005; Carp, Halenar, Quandt, Sklar, & Compton, 2009;
Koban, Pourtois, Vocat, & Vuilleumier, 2010; Miltner,
Brauer, Hecht, Trippe, & Coles, 2004; van Schie, Mars,
Coles, & Bekkering, 2004). Likewise, an observer FRN
(oFRN) can be measured during the same time window as
the classical FRN (around 200–300 ms), but with smaller
amplitudes for observers than for agents of actions (Fukushima
& Hiraki, 2009; Leng & Zhou, 2010; Yu & Zhou, 2006),
possibly reflecting a decreased saliency of other-generated
errors relative to one’s own (Bellebaum, Kobza, Thiele, &
Daum, 2010). Unlike the oERN (to the best of our knowledge),
the neural sources of the oFRN have not been investi-
gated yet.
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Recently, a growing number of studies have examined
how action-monitoring systems are influenced by social
factors. For instance, brain responses to observed errors
(oERN) are modulated by the relationship between agent
and observer, with larger effects when perceived similarity
is high (Carp et al., 2009), and during cooperation, as
compared with competition (Koban et al., 2010). Besides
this research on internal error monitoring, a few other stud-
ies also investigated the influence of social relationship on
processing external feedback information about outcomes
(Mobbs et al., 2009). However, an important limitation of
these studies is that they focused either on self-generated
actions only or on the observation of others’ actions only
(but see de Bruijn, de Lange, von Cramon, & Ullsperger,
2009). For example, a recent study (Rigoni, Polezzi,
Rumiati, Guarino, & Sartori, 2009) reported a reduced am-
plitude of the FRN/MFN in social (comparative and com-
petitive) versus individual conditions during a gambling
task, but because the outcomes for self and other were
presented at the same time, both types of information could
not be disentangled. Another recent study (Van Meel & Van
Heijningen, 2010) found an FRN for negative, as compared
with positive, feedback during a learning task only in a
competitive setting, not in an individual condition, indicat-
ing that the mere presence of other people may enhance the
processing of (external) feedback, perhaps due to social
comparison effects (Boksem, Ruys, & Aarts, 2011). Accord-
ingly, fMRI results indicate that the dorsomedial prefrontal
cortex, a region typically recruited by mentalizing tasks
(Kelley et al., 2002; Mitchell, Banaji, & Macrae, 2005),
shows higher activation during error monitoring in social
(cooperative or competitive) context, relative to individual
settings (Radke et al., 2011).
Results concerning social effects on ERPs to others’
feedback are also mixed: In a gambling task, the oFRN/
oMFN was larger when participants thought that they were
observing other humans rather than a computer (Fukushima
& Hiraki, 2009). The oFRN was also larger for friends than
for strangers in one study (Kang, Hirsh, & Chasteen, 2010),
but not in another (Leng & Zhou, 2010). Interestingly,
cooperative versus antagonistic relationships between the
participant and another virtual player during a gambling
task produced no effects on ERPs to own losses, but the
oFRN/oMFNwas amplified for losses of cooperating partners
and gains of antagonistic partners, indicating an evaluation of
outcomes based on self-interest (Itagaki & Katayama, 2008;
Marco-Pallares, Kramer, Strehl, Schroder, & Munte, 2010).
However, gambling outcomes are directly related not to per-
formance accuracy but, rather, to probabilistic factors. Given
previous evidence that observation effects depend on per-
ceived agency of the observed player, as well as interpersonal
relationships (Fukushima & Hiraki, 2006; Kang et al., 2010),
it is critical to investigate the effects of cooperative and
competitive context on performance monitoring in real two-
participant settings. In an elegant fMRI study, de Bruijn et al.
(2009) showed that feedback indicating erroneous responses
activated the ACC irrespective of social context. However,
they found that a reward-dependent activity in striatal areas
was modulated by cooperation versus competition, indicating
a possible dissociation between observed error and reward
processing.
Here, we investigate—in contrast to previous studies—
the time course of brain responses to feedback in both the
agent and observer of actions, to determine whether similar
effects of social context are observed for positive and neg-
ative outcomes based on performance (in contrast to gam-
bling, which is less relevant for self-monitoring) and to
identify the possible neural circuits underlying these modu-
lations of scalp ERPs. We measured the feedback-locked
ERPs to positive versus negative outcomes during a speeded
go/no-go task and compared pairs of real participants in
either cooperative or competitive conditions. Results for
the response-locked ERPs following own and observed
commission errors (ERN and oERN, respectively) of the
same data set, using this go/no task, were reported elsewhere
(Koban et al., 2010) and revealed earlier and enhanced
error-related components in cooperating versus competing
observers. Contrary to error observation, the processing of
own errors (as indicated by ERN and Pe) was not influenced
by social context, and we reasoned that this might reflect the
generic nature of early brain responses to commission errors
(based on internal signals). However, the feedback-related
ERPs provide a different window into action monitoring,
and feedback processing relies on the integration of different
(external) information, where social and motivational influ-
ences can be more easily observed. In the present study, we
reanalyzed the same experimental data set, including the
same participants, but we focused on different trial types
(fast and slow hits on go trials), completely different time
windows (corresponding to brain activity elicited by the
visual feedback given 1 s after the response), and different
components (FRN and feedback P300 instead of ERN and
Pe), unlike our previous report (Koban et al., 2010).
In our go/no-go task, positive feedback was given fol-
lowing hits made within an adaptive time limit on go trials
(fast hits) and after correctly withheld responses on no-go
trials, whereas negative feedback was given following hits
made beyond the time limit on go trials (slow hits) and
following commission errors on no-go trials. We reasoned
that feedback on no-go trials would have low predictive
relevance (i.e., could provide only redundant information
about actual outcome), since these actions (commission
errors and correct withholding) could already be monitored
(and generate an ERN) through internal motor representations
for the player and mirroring motor representations for the
observer. In contrast, feedback on go trials (fast and slow hits)
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was relevant throughout the experiment, since the time limit
was adapted online on the basis of individual reaction times
(RTs), so that actual performance outcome was difficult to
anticipate for player and observer at the time of the response.
Consequently, our first hypothesis was that, if both FRN and
oFRN reflect a prediction error signal, they should manifest
only on go , but not on no-go, trials—even though commis-
sion errors on no-go trials are more discordant with the actual
task goals than are slow responses on go trials.
More critically, our second and major prediction concerned
the influence of interpersonal context (cooperation vs. com-
petition). For feedback about own actions, cooperation (but
not competition) should increase the social pressure to per-
form well (Festinger, 1954; Van Meel & Van Heijningen,
2010) and amplify the motivational impact of negative per-
formance (which also affects the co-player), leading to larger
FRNs. On the other hand, competitive settings could make
negative performance feedback more salient as well (cf. Van
Meel & Van Heijningen, 2010), so the direction of this effect
is open to empirical investigation. For the observation condi-
tion, if others’ performance feedback is mainly processed
according to self-centered reward outcome (Hajcak et al.,
2006; Holroyd & Coles, 2002), as previously suggested
(Itagaki & Katayama, 2008; Marco-Pallares et al., 2010),
the oFRN should be larger in cooperating observers for neg-
ative, as compared with positive, outcomes, whereas an in-
verse effect may be found in competing observers. However,
because an oFRN has also been reported for neutral observers
(Fukushima & Hiraki, 2009; Leng & Zhou, 2010; Marco-
Pallares et al., 2010; Yu & Zhou, 2006) and attributed to
simulation processes, a smaller oFRN might also arise during
competition, where self- and other-based evaluations might
interfere with each other. Indeed, recent fMRI data suggested
a possible dissociation between error monitoring and reward
processing in competing observers (de Bruijn et al., 2009).
Hence, if the oFRN reflects a reward-based signal originating
in the striatum, feedback effects should be reversed for com-
petition. On the other hand, if the oFRN is driven by mirrored
error monitoring, as observed in medial prefrontal areas with
fMRI (de Bruijn et al., 2009), it should be similar in cooper-
ation and competition.
Finally, the third goal of our study was to identify the
putative neural sources of these effects using a topographical
analysis (Michel, Seeck, & Landis, 1999; Pourtois, Delplan-
que, Michel, & Vuilleumier, 2008), combined with a distrib-
uted linear inverse solution model (Michel et al., 2004; Michel
et al., 2001; Pascual-Marqui, 2002). While the FRN is attrib-
uted to generators in the MPFC and ACC (Gehring &
Willoughby, 2002; Miltner et al., 1997), to our knowledge,
no study has explored the neural sources of the oFRN com-
ponent and their modulation by social factors. Moreover,
because changes in the amplitude of ERP components at
specific electrodes on the scalp may reflect either a
modulation of a single generator or a recruitment of partly
distinct regions, a full understanding of these electro-
physiological markers and their modulations requires
additional analysis beyond waveform amplitude meas-
ures (Pourtois et al., 2008).
Materials and method
Participants
Participants were described in detail in our previous article
(Koban et al., 2010). In brief, 34 healthy volunteers (16
men) with normal or corrected-to-normal vision participated
and constituted 17 pairs of partners, which were familiar
with each other (e.g., friends or colleagues). Data from one
pair of participants (2 women) had to be excluded from
analyses due to excessive movement artifacts. Participants
were randomly assigned to one of two social context con-
ditions (cooperation vs. competition), as described in detail
in Koban et al.: Cooperation was induced by rewarding the
participants on the basis of their joint performance after
every two blocks of the task (one block for each player),
whereas in competition, only the better of the 2 performing
players was rewarded after every two blocks. These rules
were given to both participants prior to the actual EEG
recordings. The proportion of male and female participants
and same-sex versus opposite-sex pairs was exactly
matched across both experimental groups. Familiarity and
liking between the 2 players was measured with custom-
designed items regarding the duration and closeness of
acquaintanceship or friendship and did not differ between
social context conditions (for details, see Koban et al.,
2010).
Because the processing of others’ feedback (oFRN) in
noncompetitive situations has previously been associated to
individual traits of empathy (Fukushima & Hiraki, 2009),
we also obtained questionnaire data on empathy, using the
Interpersonal Reactivity Index (IRI; Davis, 1983). The IRI
measures four different dimensions of empathy (perspective
taking [PT], emotional compassion [EC], personal distress,
fantasy scale), which were submitted to correlation analyses
with feedback-monitoring activity in cooperative and com-
petitive situations. Additionally, trait aggressiveness was
assessed with the Aggressiveness Questionnaire (TAQ;
Buss & Perry, 1992).
Stimuli and task
We used a modified version of a go/no-go task used in
previous studies (Aarts & Pourtois, 2010; Dhar & Pourtois,
2011; Pourtois, 2011; Vocat et al., 2008) to generate a high
number of errors with maintained motivat ion.
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Participants in every pair took turns in performing and
observing the go/no-go task in a total of eight blocks
(four blocks as player, four as observer), each compris-
ing 60 trials (40 go trials and 20 no-go trials). Every
trial started with a cue (black arrow pointing up or
down, random duration of 1–2 s), which then turned
green (go trial), turned cyan (no-go trial), or changed
direction (no-go trial). The player had to respond as
quickly as possible to go trials by a keypress. The time
limit was initially set to 350 ms and then adapted online
during the experimental blocks (arithmetic mean value
between 350 ms and the RTs of the last correct hit
within the time limit), in order to increase speed pressure
and make the outcome success on go trials difficult to predict
for the participants (see Aarts & Pourtois, 2010; Dhar &
Pourtois, 2011; Koban et al., 2010; Pourtois, 2011; Vocat et
al., 2008). Importantly, participants were not aware of this
manipulation.
Feedback was presented 1,000 ms after response on-
set and consisted of either a green dot for a correct
keypress within the time limit (fast hits) and correct no-
go trials or a red dot for a keypress beyond the time
limit (slow hits) and commission errors on no-go trials.
Red and green dots were equiluminant. To ensure a
sufficient amount of attention and involvement of the
participants during the observation blocks, we instructed
them to silently count the correct no-go trials of their
partner (i.e., the player), as has been done for observed
errors in previous studies on action observation (e.g.,
van Schie et al., 2004).
EEG recording and analysis
EEG was recorded using 64 electrodes from both partici-
pants in each pair, using two synchronized Biosemi Active
Systems. Data were online high-pass filtered with 0.1 Hz
and sampled at 2048 Hz. For offline preprocessing, the
signal was filtered with 0.5-Hz high-pass and corrected for
eye blink artifacts, using an algorithm as implemented in
BESA software (Berg & Scherg, 1994). Response-locked
ERPs on fast hits and error trials of this data set were
reported in our previous article (Koban et al., 2010). We
selected epochs from −500 ms before to 1,000 ms after
feedback presentation for fast and slow hits (go trials), as well
as after correct and incorrect no-go trials, corresponding to
positive and negative performance feedback after own and
observed trials. Segments were baseline corrected using the
prestimulus interval (−500–0 ms). Epochs containing large
nonneurophysiological artifacts were excluded before
averaging. Individual average waveforms were then fil-
tered with 1-Hz high-pass and 30-Hz low-pass filter and
downsampled to 512-Hz sampling rate for calculation of
ERP components and for subsequent topographical and
source analyses.
The amplitude of the FRN components (observer and
player FRN) was defined, following standard practice and
using an unbiased a priori defined time window, as the mean
voltage between 200 and 300 ms at electrodes Fz, FCz, and
Cz. For the analysis of the P300, the mean voltage from 300
to 400 ms after feedback presentation was calculated at the
same electrode sites along the midline. Statistical analysis
on ERP components was performed using a mixed model
ANOVAwith experimental context (cooperation vs. competi-
tion) as a between-subjects factor and trial type (go vs. no-go
trial), electrode position (Fz, FCz, and Cz), agency (player vs.
observer), and feedback (positive vs. negative feedback) as
within-subjects factors.
Topographical analysis
Complementary to classical ERP analysis, we performed a
topographical segmentation algorithm based on K-mean spa-
tial cluster analysis (Pascual-Marqui, Michel, & Lehmann,
1995) and implemented in Cartool software by Denis Brunet
(http://brainmapping.unige.ch/Cartool.htm). These analyses
also allowed us to obtain additional and unbiased infor-
mation about differences in neurophysiological response
between conditions, not available with standard ERP anal-
yses, which typically focus on only one or a few preselected
electrodes.
This method has been detailed elsewhere (Murray, Brunet,
& Michel, 2008; Pourtois et al., 2008). In brief, the aim of
microstate segmentation is to identify periods of temporal
stability (and by extension, changes) in the distribution of
the global electric field (i.e., topography) over the scalp sur-
face and over successive time points, by using a formal
statistical approach applied to the whole topography informa-
tion, rather than to amplitude values from single electrodes.
These stable topographic periods are usually referred to as
“microstates” (Michel et al., 1999). Following standard prac-
tice (Murray et al., 2008; Pourtois, 2011; Pourtois et al., 2008;
Pourtois, Thut, Grave de Peralta, Michel, & Vuilleumier,
2005), segmentation into microstates was first performed on
the grand average ERP waveforms of slow and fast hits in
both agency conditions (player and observer) and both social
contexts (cooperation and competition), for the time window
of 0–500 ms after feedback presentation, so as to cover all
stimulus-locked (feedback-locked) components of interest.
The optimal number of different topographies (maps) explain-
ing at least 90 % of variance was selected on the basis of an
objective cross-validation criterion (Pascual-Marqui et al.,
1995).
To statistically assess the validity of these maps, a back-
fitting procedure was then applied. The template maps identi-
fied by the clustering algorithm in the group-averaged ERPs
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were spatially fitted to the individual-participant ERP data to
provide estimates of their representation across time and task
conditions. This procedure provides fine-grained quantitative
values, such as global explained variance (GEV, or goodness
of fit), which is a critical index of the significance of a given
topography at particular time-points, not available in a classi-
cal component analysis (Picton et al., 2000). GEV represents
the sum of the explained variance weighted by the
global field power at each moment in time. Because we
were especially interested in the processing of negative feed-
back as indicated by the FRN component (Itagaki &
Katayama, 2008), we assessed whether the topography of
the ERP signal was reliably altered during this time interval
(200–300 ms) separately as a function of agency (player vs.
observer) and social context (cooperation vs. competition).
GEV values obtained after fitting were then submitted to
mixed model ANOVAs.
Source analyses
We used standardized low-resolution brain electromagnetic
tomography (Pascual-Marqui, 2002) to estimate the config-
uration of neural generators underlying the dominant top-
ographies described by the previous clustering analysis.
sLORETA assumes a maximal “smoothness” of the distri-
bution of standardized current density in order to restrict the
three-dimensional inverse solutions given by the topograph-
ical potential distribution on the scalp. It uses a three-shell
spherical head model that is co-registered to the MNI152
template (Mazziotta et al., 2001) in standardized stereotactic
space (Talairach & Tournoux, 1988) and restricts source
dipoles to 6,239 cortical gray-matter voxels with a 5-mm
resolution.
We used a regularization parameter of SNR 0 100 to
estimate the source activity for individual ERPs (0–500 ms
after feedback onset) in the four different feedback condi-
tions on go trials: player fast hits, player slow hits, observer
fast hits, and observer slow hits, for both experimental
groups (i.e., social contexts). Because, to our knowledge,
no prior study has investigated the neural sources of the
observer FRN, as compared with the FRN, we first deter-
mined the neural generators of the FRN and the oFRN
separately, irrespective of (i.e., collapsing across) the two
social context conditions (cooperation and competition). We
statistically assessed the differences in source activity for
negative (slow hits), as compared with positive, (fast hits),
feedback, using paired t-tests. Regions that showed signifi-
cantly higher current source density for negative, as com-
pared with positive, feedback (slow vs. fast hits) were
submitted to a region of interest (ROI) approach in order
to compare activations in the different experimental condi-
tions in more detail (cooperation vs. competition, player vs.
observer). Following the logic of an internal localizer (Friston,
Rotshtein, Geng, Sterzer, & Henson, 2006), this ROI defini-
tion based on feedback correctness is orthogonal to the exper-
imental factors that were of main interest in the subsequent
analysis (social context).
Results
Behavioral results
No differences in questionnaire measures of aggressiveness
or empathy were found between the experimental groups,
but the perceived competitiveness was reliably influenced
by experimental context in the predicted way, as found in
debriefing questionnaires (see Koban, et al., 2010), suggest-
ing that our manipulation was effective.
The number of correct fast hits was not significantly
different during cooperation (M 0 61.1 trials, SD 0 ±12.9)
and competition (53.3 trials ± 15.4), t(30) 0 −1.56, p 0 .13,
nor was the number of slow hits (i.e., go responses made
after the correct time limit; 93.9 ± 12.3 trials in cooperation,
102.8 ± 17.8 in competition), t(30) 0 1.64, p 0 .11, or the
number of errors on no-go trials (32.2 ± 15.8 in cooperation,
28.3 ± 17.4 in competition), t(30) 0 0.66, p 0 .51. As was
expected, mean RTs were significantly shorter for fast hits
(238 ± 31 ms in cooperation, 251 ± 37 ms in competition)
and errors (269 ± 32 ms in cooperation, 271 ± 50 ms in
competition) than for slow hits (342 ± 23 ms in cooperation,
357 ± 41 ms in competition), F(2, 60) 0 184.7, p < .001, but
were comparable for the two social context groups, F(1, 30) 0
0.7, p 0 .39. There was no significant interaction between
these factors [feedback type × social context, F(2, 60) 0 0.8,
p 0 .45]. The behavioral data therefore ensure a similar distri-
bution of events and response latencies in the critical experi-
mental conditions and no difference in strategy between
conditions regarding emphasis on speed versus accuracy (cf.
Koban et al., 2010).
We next looked at whether slow (negative) and fast
(positive) feedback had a differential impact on behavioral
adjustments, such as changes in postfeedback RTs. If par-
ticipants used the performance feedback as relevant infor-
mation in order to adjust behavior, they should speed up
after “too slow” feedback. Therefore, we compared RT
changes on trials following fast hits versus trials following
slow hits (difference between RTs in trial n − trial n − 1) in
the two social context conditions. A highly significant main
effect of previous trial type was found, F(1, 30) 0 146.1,
p < .001, indicating that participants slowed down following
fast hits (+52.5 ms in cooperation, +62.2 ms in competition),
whereas they became faster following slow hits (−41.0 ms in
cooperation, −44.1 ms in competition). Thus, people did
adjust their effort and behavior to improve performance in
response to feedback. However, there was no effect of
Cogn Affect Behav Neurosci (2012) 12:460–478 465
social context and no significant interaction (both Fs < 1),
suggesting that increased feedback components in coopera-
tion did not lead to observable behavioral adjustment
differences.
Electrophysiological results: FRN
Average ERPs time-locked to feedback presentation (red
negative vs. green positive isoluminant dots) showed a
conspicuous relative negativity on fronto-central electrodes
that was specific to the go trials (Fig. 1a). No differences in
ERP waveforms were apparent on no-go trials (see supple-
mentary Fig. S1). An ANOVA performed on the mean
amplitude of the FRN (200–300 ms) disclosed a highly
significant main effect for trial type (go vs. no-go trial),
F(1, 30) 0 44.9, p < .001, and an interaction effect of trial
type and feedback (negative vs. positive), F(1, 30) 0 24.3,
p < .001, but no three-way-interaction with electrode (please
see supplementary Table S2 for all mean amplitudes and
standard deviations).
Separate statistical analyses (ANOVAs) were carried out
to confirm that no effect on FRN was observed when the
feedback was weak in predictive relevance (i.e. no-go trials,
in which participants could monitor their own and their
partner’s performance using internal motor signals or ob-
served motor responses; see supplementary material S6), in
contrast to feedback presented after go trials (which provid-
ed participants with relevant information about their speed
performance—i.e., fast vs. slow hits). Thus, when compar-
ing commission errors and correct withholds on no-go trials,
we found no effect of feedback (positive vs. negative) during
the FRN time window (200–300 ms), F(1, 30) 0 0.26, p 0 .74,
and no interaction effects. By contrast, the amplitude of the
FRN on go trials (fast and slow hits) was reliably modulated
by experimental factors (see Fig. 1a). A mixed model
ANOVA on the mean FRN amplitude (200–300 ms) with
feedback type (positive/fast hits vs. negative/slow hits), elec-
trode position (Fz, FCz, Cz), and agency (player vs. observer)
as within-subjects factors, plus social context (cooperation vs.
competition) as a between-subjects factor, revealed a signifi-
cant main effect for agency, F(1, 30) 0 15.3, p <.001, and
electrode, F(2, 60) 0 6.3, p 0 .003, as well as for feedback,
F(1, 30) 0 47.7, p < .001. This reflected a more negative FRN
component for negative, as compared with positive, outcomes
(after slow vs. fast hits, respectively) over all experimental
conditions (see also Fig. 1b). More important, the interaction
between agency and feedbackwas significant,F(1, 30) 0 11.6,
p 0 .002, indicating stronger FRN differences in players than
in observers, as was also the interaction between social con-
text and feedback, F(1, 30) 0 5.8, p 0 .023, indicating larger
differences in the cooperation, as compared with the compe-
tition, context. In addition, the interaction between electrode
and feedback was also significant, F(2, 60) 0 11.5, p < .001.
Furthermore, there was a significant three-way interaction
between feedback, electrode, and social context, F(2, 60) 0
8.6, p < .001, pointing at topographical differences of the
feedback-related effects between the two conditions (see
below). Finally, the three-way interaction between feed-
back, agency, and social context approached significance,
F(1, 30) 0 3.2, p 0 .082, suggesting that the effect of social
context on FRN was slightly stronger in players than in
observers. To verify this, we performed Tukey tests on the
FRN amplitude differences (negative–positive), collapsed
across all three electrodes: This analysis revealed that only
the player in the cooperation condition showed a larger FRN
effect (i.e., enhanced FRN for negative, as compared with
positive, feedback on go trials), relative to all other condi-
tions—that is, player competition (p 0 .028), observer coop-
eration (p 0 .016), and observer competition (p 0 .006). None
of the other pairwise comparisons was significant (all ps > .6).
Although there were only slight differences in the fre-
quency of negative feedback across trial types, we also
formally ruled out the possibility that different FRN ampli-
tudes might reflect subtle effects of feedback likelihood (cf.
Hajcak, Moser, Holroyd, & Simons, 2007) by repeating
these analyses, but now including the proportion of negative
feedback as a continuous covariate in our general linear
model. However, this did not change the significance of all
the effects reported above. To further rule out the possibility
that latency differences could have biased the analyses of
mean amplitude, we extracted the latency ofmaximal negative
difference between the ERPs following negative versus posi-
tive feedback, using a generous time window of 200–350 ms
to cover possible differences in FRN peak latency. A mixed-
model ANOVAyielded neither significant latency differences
for agency, context, or electrode position nor any interaction
effect.
In sum, these ERP results confirm that participants dif-
ferentially processed negative (slow hits) versus positive
(fast hits) feedbacks during go trials, leading to larger FRN
amplitude for the former than for the latter condition. Crit-
ically, this effect was significantly modulated by agency and
social context, as demonstrated by larger amplitude differ-
ences for players than for observers and for cooperators than
for competitors.
Electrophysiological results: P300
Although we had no specific prediction for later feedback-
evoked components, a large positive deflection following
negative feedback was apparent in the cooperation player
condition, resembling a P300 (although with rather frontal
maximum over FCz). This accords with a few previous
studies reporting P300 effects evoked by feedback informa-
tion (e.g., Hajcak et al., 2005; Yeung & Sanfey, 2004). To
better characterize this effect, we performed similar analyses
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for the P300 time window (300–400 ms; see Fig. 1). The
mixed-effects ANOVA showed only a trend for the main
effect of feedback, F(1, 30) 0 3.1, p 0 .087, but the interac-
tion between feedback and social context was significant,
F(1, 30) 0 7.1, p 0 .012. Similarly, the interactions between
feedback and agency, F(1, 30) 0 6.3, p 0 .018, and between
feedback and electrode position, F(2, 60) 0 17.7, p < .001,
were both significant. The ANOVA also revealed a signifi-
cant three-way interaction between feedback, electrode, and
social context, F(2, 60) 0 5.9, p 0 .005, as well as between
feedback, electrode, agency, F(2, 60) 0 5.5, p 0 .006, both of
which imply topographical differences in the feedback ef-
fect depending on social context and agency. Planned com-
parisons (based on Tukey tests) between positive and
negative feedback were also performed for this P300 effect
in each of the four main experimental conditions (play and
observe in both social contexts). This revealed that the P300
modulation (i.e., larger amplitude for negative than for
positive feedback) was actually significant only in the play
cooperation condition (p 0 .0003), but in none of the other
three conditions (all ps > .70; see also Fig. 1c).
Finally, we assessed whether these amplitude modula-
tions of feedback-related activity (FRN and P300) might
be related to interindividual variations in empathy and PT
(see Fukushima & Hiraki, 2009). To this aim, we calculated
Spearman rank order correlations between the mean ampli-
tude differences for each component (slow − fast hit feed-
back collapsed across Fz, FCz, and Cz) and the scores from
subscales of the IRI. The PT subscale correlated significantly
with the player’s FRN, r 0 −.41, p < .05, and the P300, r 0 .36,
p < .05, whereas the EC scale correlated positively with the
observer’s oP300, r 0 .36, p < .05 (see Fig. 2). Notably, these
correlations found for the whole sample of participants were
driven mainly by participants in the cooperation condition,
which showed generally higher correlations when considered
alone (FRN ~ PT, r 0 −.51, p < .05; P300 ~ PT, r 0 .44, n.s.;
and oP300 ~ EC, r 0 .54, p < .05), relative to participants in the
competition condition (r 0 −.25, r 0 .27, and r 0 .25; all n.s.).
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Fig. 1 ERPs elicited by feedback on go trials at electrode FCz (a),
mean evoked potential amplitude differences (slow − fast hits) during
the FRN time window (200–300 ms) at electrodes Fz, FCz, and Cz (b),
and mean evoked potential amplitude differences during the P300 time
window (300–400 ms) at electrodes Fz, FCz, and Cz (c). Vertical bars
denote standard errors
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These selective correlations further underscore the specific
effects of cooperation on both the player’s and the observer’s
responses. Relationship between feedback-specific compo-
nents and response-/error-locked components reported in our
previous article (Koban et al., 2010) can be found in the
supplementary material (S5).
Topographic results
The standard mean amplitude analyses performed above
revealed several significant interactions between feedback
and electrode position, suggesting possible changes in the
electric field configuration (i.e., topography) of the FRN as
a function of condition. To gain further insight into these
topographic changes, which suggest changes in neural gen-
erators rather than just amplitude modulations, we per-
formed a standard spatiotemporal cluster analysis based on
K-means (Pascual-Marqui et al., 1995; Pourtois et al., 2008),
followed by source analysis. This segmentation avoids a
priori selection of specific electrodes or time windows. To
this aim, we used the eight grand average ERP waveforms
(2 context × 2 feedback × 2 agency) during a large time
interval (0–500 ms post-feedback-onset) that encompassed
all ERP components of interest.
Results from this segmentation analysis disclosed a spa-
tiotemporal solution with 19 dominant topographical maps1
(see Fig. 3a, b), which explained 90.7 % of variance. In
agreement with the conventional ERP analysis, qualitative
differences in topography were observed mainly in the time
window of the FRN between 250 and 300 ms. The P300
component (map 12) was expressed mainly in the following
time interval, between 300 and 400 ms.
In the cooperation context, a distinctive topography (map
11) was uniquely present for negative feedback and similarly
arose in both the player and the observer (Fig. 3a). Another
distribution of the electric field (map 8) was elicited by pos-
itive feedback during the same time window; this map oc-
curred only briefly and later (after map 11) following negative
feedback.
In the competition context, the player also showed distinc-
tive maps during the FRN time window, but with a very
different configuration for negative feedback (map 9) and
positive feedback (map 10). Both of these maps were again
followed by map 8. Remarkably, this differentiation of feed-
back type was specific to the player. In the competing observer,
map 9 was not specific to errors but was elicited by both
positive and negative feedback. Map 10 was not observed.
To confirm the statistical significance of these different
topographic segments following negative feedback in com-
petition and cooperation conditions, the two FRN-specific
maps (9 and 11) were fitted back on the ERP data of each
individual participant, using a noncompetitive spatial-fitting
procedure (Murray et al., 2008). This enabled us to test for
potential significant differences in the GEV (corresponding
to the goodness of fit) of these dominant topographies for
negative performance feedback across experimental condi-
tions. The ANOVA revealed significant interaction effects
for map and context, F(1, 30) 0 6.3, p 0 .017, map and
agency, F(1, 30) 0 4.4, p 0 .044, and map, agency, and
context, F(1, 39) 0 10.7, p 0 .003 (see Fig. 3c), confirming
differential FRN topographies during competition and co-
operation, as well as a modulation depending on agency
(own vs. observed performance feedback).
Taken together, the topography data suggest that the mod-
ulation of brain responses arising during the FRN timewindow
as a function of feedback relevance and social context were
associated with a recruitment of partly different networks,
leading to a partly different distribution of neural activity over
electrodes. Such differences were further explored by a distrib-
uted source localization analysis (see the next section).
Inverse solution results
We used sLORETA to estimate the possible neural gener-
ators underlying the feedback ERP topographies and their
1 Note that numbering of maps results from the clustering and the
relative time of their appearance but does not depend on topographic
characteristics and is, therefore, arbitrary.
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modulation by social context and agency. In a first step, we
collapsed the two social context conditions (cooperation and
competition) to determine sources of the FRN (player) and
oFRN (observer). To this aim, we statistically compared
negative (slow hits) and positive (fast hits) feedback in the
inverse solution space during the time interval corresponding
to the FRN (i.e., average for 250- to 300-ms interval post-
stimulus-onset, during which the topography was stable).
For the player condition (FRN), this analysis showed sig-
nificantly higher current source densities for negative than for
positive feedbacks in a large cluster encompassing the medial
frontal gyrus (MFG) and ACC (see Fig. 4a and Table 1).
For the observer condition (oFRN), neural sources were
also found in the MFG and ACC, similar to the player
condition, although extending slightly to more ventral areas
(Fig. 4b). However, additional sources were found in several
other regions, including the middle and superior frontal gyri
and orbital and rectal gyri, as well as the right posterior
superior temporal gyrus in the temporo-parietal junction
(TPJ; see Fig. 4b, c, Table 2).
Fig. 3 Results of the K-means
segmentation procedure. a The
average global field power
(GFP) per condition and
sequence of the 19 distinct
topography solutions identified
in the grand average ERPs are
shown for all experimental
conditions. Same numbers
denote the occurrence of the
same map; order of map
number is arbitary. b Duration
of each map in each condition
was determined by the
clustering algorithm as
implemented in Cartool.
Topographical properties of the
19 different maps identified by
the microstate segmentation
(blue denote negative and red
positive scalp potentials). c
Results of the fitting procedure:
Global explained variance
(GEV) for maps 9 and 11
corresponding to the FRN
topography following negative
feedback during the time
window 200–300 ms and for
the different social and agency
conditions. Vertical lines
denote error bars
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Finally, we tested how activity in these regions varied as
a function of our main experimental conditions (social con-
text and agency), by conducting an ROI analysis on the
mean current activity extracted from each source. For this
purpose, we created spheres (with a radius of 12 mm)
around the maxima identified in the inverse solution analy-
sis (negative vs. positive feedback), for each of four differ-
ent ROIs: MPFC (x-, y-, z-coordinates 0, 45, 10), right
dorsal prefrontal cortex (dPFC; 20, 60, 25), right orbitofron-
tal cortex (OFC; 5, 50, −20), and right posterior superior
temporal gyrus (rSTL/TPJ; 35, −60, 30). We then submitted
the mean source activity extracted during the 250- to 300-ms
postfeedback time interval to a mixed-model ANOVA, with
context as a between-subjects and agency and feedback as
within-subjects factors (see Fig. 4).
An overview of significant main and interaction effects is
given in Table 3. Critically, we found a main effect of
agency in all regions, which showed that playing relative
to observing tended to increase activity. The latter effect is
likely to reflect globally higher involvement and feedback
processing when acting, as compared with observing (in line
with our waveform analysis; see above). More interesting, a
consistent pattern of higher activity depending on agency ×
context (see interaction in Table 3) was found across all
frontal regions, reflecting the fact that source activity was
always the strongest for the cooperating player condition, in
line with the hypothesis that cooperation might increase the
level of feedback monitoring and cognitive control in the
player (cf. ERP results). In the STG/TPJ ROI, which is an
important region for social cognition and PT (Blakemore &
Decety, 2001; Ruby and Decety 2004), activity was modu-
lated not only by agency and context, but additionally by
feedback valence. Accordingly, only this ROI showed a
significant three-way interaction (see Table 3), with in-
creased current source density for negative feedback in the
cooperating player, but the opposite trend in the competition
context.
For completeness, we also explored the possible sources
of the P300 effect, which was not predicted in our initial
hypotheses. We therefore probed for a significant interaction
between feedback type and social context in the playing
condition, using the 300- to 400-ms time interval and the
Fig. 4 Results of the source
localization, as obtained
with sLORETA. Clusters
with significantly higher CSD
for negative versus positive
performance feedback when
playing were found mainly in
medial prefrontal regions (a).
When observing, activity in
response to negative feedback
emerged in the medial
prefrontal cortex (MPFC),
dorsal prefrontal cortex (dPFC),
orbitofrontal cortex (OFC),
and right superior temporal
lobe/temporo-parietal junction
(rSTL/TPG) (b, from top
to bottom). Graphs plot the
activity pattern in the
different ROIs for the different
experimental conditions (c).
Vertical lines denote error bars
Table 1 Peaks of significant different clusters for negative (slow hits) > positive (fast hits) feedback during playing
Anatomical location x (MNI) y (MNI) z (MNI) Cluster
size (voxels)
Max
t-value
p-value
Anterior cingulate −5 40 20 25 3.00 .003
Medial frontal gyrus −5 45 20 26 3.01 .003
Superior frontal gyrus −10 50 25 1 2.27 .015
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contrast: (Negative Coop Play > Positive Coop Play) >
(Negative Comp Play > Positive Comp Play). Significant
interaction effects were found in a large cluster comprising
the ACC and MPFC, plus smaller clusters in the dorsolateral
prefrontal cortex, anterior insula, and inferior frontal gyri
bilaterally. Additional activations were observed in the right
and left precentral gyrus (see Table 4).
Discussion
The goal of our study was to characterize the interactive
effects of agency, predictive relevance, and interpersonal
setting on brain systems responsible for monitoring one’s
own versus others’ performance. In accord with our first
hypothesis, we found that feedback-related activity was
influenced by the predictive value of feedback information
about outcomes: The FRN effect was abolished on no-go
trials, because participants could rely on internal represen-
tations to detect whether an error had been committed or not
(see Koban et al., 2010). On the other hand, since the
outcome of any given go trial was difficult to predict on
the basis of internal monitoring mechanisms alone (due to
the adaptive time limit), the performance feedback (negative
vs. positive) following (slow vs. fast) go responses was
highly relevant and informative throughout the task (for both
participants in a pair) and, hence, significantly modulated the
FRN as well as the behavioral postfeedback adjustment in
RTs. Remarkably, the effect on the FRN was observed in both
the player and the observer conditions. These findings not
only extend previous results for error and feedbackmonitoring
during one’s own performance (Heldmann et al., 2008;
Holroyd & Coles, 2002; Stahl, 2010), but also provide the
first evidence, to the best of our knowledge, that predictive
relevance also influences the processing of performance feed-
back in the observer (oFRN), providing further support for
partly shared mechanisms underlying own and observed ac-
tion monitoring.
Whereas predictive relevance appears to be a necessary
condition for the generation of FRN, as well as oFRN, our
results also show that these prediction error signals are
amplified as a function of agency and context, two factors
that determine the social relevance of information. With
regard to the role of agency in performance monitoring,
we found a larger FRN for one’s own than for observed
performance feedback. This effect corroborates previous
results (Bellebaum et al., 2010; Fukushima & Hiraki, 2009;
Leng & Zhou, 2010; Yu & Zhou, 2006). As was proposed by
Bellebaum et al. (2010), it is likely that such agency-related
enhancement results from the higher personal relevance of
feedback about one’s own performance and is consistent with
a greater importance of such feedback in terms of subsequent
behavioral adjustment (Holroyd & Coles, 2002; Ridderinkhof,
Ullsperger, Crone, & Nieuwenhuis, 2004).
Table 2 Peaks of significant different clusters for negative (slow) > positive (fast) feedback in the observer condition
Anatomical location x (MNI) y (NMI) z (MNI) Cluster size (voxels) Max t-value p-value
Anterior cingulate 5 50 0 40 2.44 .010
Inferior frontal gyrus 10 40 −20 1 2.09 .023
Medial frontal gyrus 15 50 10 58 2.59 .007
Middle frontal gyrus 20 60 25 6 2.95 .003
Orbital gyrus 5 50 −20 14 2.33 .013
Rectal gyrus 5 50 −25 6 2.30 .014
Superior frontal gyrus 25 60 20 26 2.91 .003
Superior temporal gyrus 35 -60 30 5 2.58 .008
Table 3 Significant main and interaction effects of feedback type (positive vs. negative), agency (player vs. observer), and context (cooperation vs.
competition) on the ROI activity during the feedback related negativity (FRN)
ROI (x,y,z MNI) Main effect
Feedback
Main effect Agency Agency × context Feedback × context Feedback ×
agency × context
MPFC (0,45,10) (1,30) 0 6.3,
p 0 .018
F(1, 30) 0 16.5, p 0 .0003 F(1, 30) 0 7.0, p 0 .013 n.s. F(1, 30) 0 3.8,
p 0 .060
dPFC (20, 60, 25) n.s. F(1, 30) 0 10.1, p 0 .003 F(1, 30) 0 5.6, p 0 .025 n.s. n.s.
OFC (5, 50, −20) n.s. F(1, 30) 0 10.1, p 0 .003 F(1, 30) 0 4.6, p 0 .040 n.s. n.s.
STG/TPJ (35, −60, 30) n.s. F(1, 30) 0 12.3, p 0 .001 n.s. F(1, 30) 0 4.9,
p 0 .035
F(1, 30) 0 3.8,
p 0 .043
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Most important, classical ERP, but also topographical
and source analysis, results showed a strong modulation of
feedback processing as a function of social context. In the
cooperative condition, the difference between responses to
negative versus positive performance feedback was greater
than in the competitive condition, across the two agency
conditions (observer and player). This finding suggests that,
in cooperative settings, one’s own performance information
might be more relevant and salient because the agent is
responsible for the outcome of both players. Similarly, the
performance of the observed partner might be more salient
during cooperation. In the following sections, we discuss
these findings in detail.
Topographies and underlying neural generators of player
and observer FRN
Classical ERP analyses based on waveforms at a few elec-
trodes are not sufficient to characterize all quantitative and,
especially, qualitative changes in neural responses between
conditions (Michel et al., 1999; Pourtois et al., 2008). There-
fore, in addition to the quantitative amplitude differences for
the FRN and oFRN waveforms at frontocentral electrodes,
our unbiased spatiotemporal analysis also revealed signifi-
cant changes in the distribution and temporal properties of
the electric field (i.e., topography) depending on both agen-
cy and social context, which could not readily be identified
by waveform analysis alone. Importantly, these different
topographical configurations presumably imply changes in
the neural generators activated during feedback processing
(Lehmann & Skrandies, 1980; Michel et al., 2001). Source
reconstructions of the FRN and oFRN demonstrated that the
neural sources of the player’s FRN were located mainly in
medial prefrontal structures (MPFC), including the dorsal
ACC, consistent with previous source localization results
for feedback processing during various tasks (e.g., Gehring
& Willoughby, 2002; Miltner et al., 1997). The MPFC and,
especially, ACC are involved in cognitive control and action
monitoring (Holroyd & Coles, 2002), but also in the evalu-
ation of the motivational or affective significance of events,
particularly for the more ventral parts of the ACC (Aarts &
Pourtois, 2010; Bush, Luu, & Posner, 2000; Gehring &
Willoughby, 2002). Our source localization results also
pointed to the involvement of the MPFC in the generation
of the observer’s FRN (oFRN), but in a slightly more ventral
location, as compared with the MPFC cluster found for the
player’s FRN. This further accords with the notion of shared
neural substrates for monitoring actions performed by
oneself and those performed by social partners.
Critically, however, during observation, the processing of
negative feedback additionally recruited more dorsal and or-
bital frontal areas, as well as the right STG/TPJ. The dPFC,
especially the superior frontal gyrus, is implicated in higher-
order executive functions (Koechlin & Summerfield, 2007),
including attention allocation, episodic retrieval, and working
memory (Overwalle, 2009; Petrides, 2005). The cluster found
in the superior frontal gyrus resembles activation patterns seen
during introspection or mentalizing tasks (Goldberg, Harel, &
Malach, 2006; Schmitz, Kawahara-Baccus, & Johnson, 2004)
and moral reasoning (Greene, Nystrom, Engell, Darley, &
Cohen, 2004), as well as joint attention (Williams, Waiter,
Perra, Perrett, & Whiten, 2005). A recent study (Radke et al.,
2011) similarly showed an increase in dorsomedial PFC
activity (although left lateralized) during negative feedback
processing in social, but not in nonsocial (private), task
performance. Given such overlap of executive control func-
tions with social and self-related reasoning, this region could
implement a system for the “social control” of actions—that
is, the allocation of attention to performance feedback as a
socially relevant event. In social contexts, such evalua-
tion could take place for both self-executed and observed
actions.
Table 4 Peaks of significant clusters for the interaction during the P300 (COOP negative > COOP positive feedback) > (COMP negative > COMP
positive feedback) in the player condition
Anatomical location x (MNI) y (NMI) z (MNI) Cluster size (voxels) Max t-value p-value
Anterior cingulate −10.0 20.0 25.0 67 3.63 .003
Cingulate gyrus −10.0 15.0 30.0 65 3.35 .004
Medial frontal gyrus −15.0 30.0 30.0 23 3.02 .009
Right middle frontal gyrus 35.0 15.0 35.0 8 2.83 .013
Left middle frontal gyrus −30.0 20.0 35.0 10 3.15 .007
Right inferior frontal gyrus 35.0 5.0 30.0 7 3.05 .008
Left inferior frontal gyrus −35.0 5.0 30.0 14 3.37 .004
Right insula 35.0 −5.0 20.0 6 2.74 .015
Left insula −35.0 5.0 20.0 33 3.24 .006
Right precentral gyrus 40.0 0.0 30.0 12 3.82 .002
Left precentral gyrus −35.0 0.0 30.0 18 3.32 .005
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By contrast, the selective involvement of the OFC may
be related to the representation of emotional or motivational
factors, such as the reward value of feedback and action
outcome (Dhar, Wiersema, & Pourtois, 2011; Kringelbach,
2005; Peters & Büchel, 2010; Rushworth, Behrens,
Rudebeck, & Walton, 2007; Wallis, 2007). The OFC is also
critically involved in the social guidance of actions (Bechara,
Damasio, & Damasio, 2000; Damasio, Tranel, & Damasio,
1990), including the evaluation of their social consequences
and the experience of guilt in case of wrongdoing (Wagner,
N'Diaye, Ethofer, & Vuilleumier, 2011). Such a role of the
OFC in the social representation of action values would be
consistent with its selective response to the interaction
between self-agency and social cooperation.
Finally, the additional source in the right STS/TPJ might
reflect PT and attribution of agency when processing the
other’s feedback, since this region has an important function
in mental state attribution (e.g., Decety & Grèzes, 1999;
Mitchell, Macrae, & Banaji, 2006; Saxe & Kanwisher,
2003). Besides its general role in social cognition, the right
TPJ is also activated by attentional reorienting in spatial
cuing tasks and might implement more domain-general pro-
cesses of reorienting (Mitchell, 2008), which could also
contribute to social PT. Interestingly, both the anterior
MPFC and TPJ are important for the inhibition of shared
representations and the differentiation between self- and
other-generated actions (Brass, Ruby, & Spengler, 2009;
Spengler, von Cramon, & Brass, 2009), a function that
might be crucial during action and feedback observation.
In sum, our results show that some neural mechanisms
(especially in the MPFC) may partly be shared for process-
ing one’s own (FRN) versus other’s (oFRN) performance
feedback, in agreement with previous fMRI findings (de
Bruijn et al., 2009) and with theoretical accounts suggesting
a role for covert simulation during action understanding
(Gallese, Keysers, & Rizzolatti, 2004; Rizzolatti et al.,
2001), but are modulated by the social context of actions.
On the other hand, specific mechanisms may also exist to
allow an efficient differentiation between monitoring other-
generated or self-generated action outcomes but rely on
other regions (especially the ventral ACC and TPJ), which
were found to be involved in the generation of the oFRN in
our study.
Cooperation and perspective taking enhance feedback
processing
In line with our third prediction, we found that feedback
processing was enhanced in the cooperative, as opposed to
the competitive, context. This was verified by our ERP
waveform results, as well as the topographical and source
localization analyses, showing differential responses to the
player’s own performance feedback as a function of social
context. First, the FRN amplitude was increased in cooper-
ation, as compared with competition, and was accompanied
with enhanced current sources for negative feedback in the
MPFC and right TPJ in the former condition. As outlined
above, these regions are crucially involved in social infor-
mation processing and mental state attribution (Mitchell et
al., 2006; Saxe & Kanwisher, 2003). Furthermore, we found
a significant correlation between FRN amplitude and PT in
the cooperation condition, which provides additional sup-
port to our hypothesis that cooperation may enhance the
saliency and the affective evaluation of feedback informa-
tion. The monitoring of one’s own performance might be
more emotionally relevant in the cooperative condition,
presumably due to the social pressure associated with the
co-player. An increase in prefrontal activation was seen for
both negative and positive performance feedback in the
dPFC and OFC and may reflect a general social facilitation
effect—that is, an increase of effort and performance in
social, relative to individual, settings (Carver & Scheier,
1981; Triplett, 1898; Zajonc, 1965). As predicted by previous
behavioral studies (Johnson, 1981), this effect of social mon-
itoring should be amplified in cooperative settings, as we
found here, but did not translate into behavioral performance
differences. Alternatively, it is possible that the FRN might be
modulated by more general motivational effects and that
individuals might differ in the subjective saliency or motiva-
tional value of feedback information, but we did not obtain
individual scores to assess such individual differences. Fur-
thermore, increased saliency or relevance of the feedback
stimuli could also mediate the effects of cooperative context
on enhanced feedback processing in our experiment. Future
research is needed to disentangle the mechanistic processes by
which social factors modulate cognitive processing.
On the other hand, social effects in the ERPs were not
paralleled by differences in postfeedback adjustment between
the two social context conditions (for similar findings, see De
Bruijn, Mars, Bekkering, & Coles, 2012). Both cooperators
and competitors showed a lengthening of RTs after fast hits
and a speeding-up after slow hits. However, there was a
(nonsignificant) tendency for generally shorter RTs in coop-
eration than in competition, and average RTchanges might not
be sensitive enough to reflect trial-by-trial adjustments in
cognitive control and effort. It would be interesting to relate
single-trial electrophysiological responses following errors
(ERN) or negative feedback (FRN) to subsequent behavioral
adjustments, but the signal-to-noise ratio of scalp EEG might
not be sufficient for such analysis. Future studies could use
intracranial EEG, single-trial time frequency, or single-trial
topographical analyses to address these questions. We also
note that due to our block design, we could not investigate
behavioral changes following error observation, which might
also differ across contexts (De Bruijn et al., 2012; Núñez
Castellar, Notebaert, Van den Bossche, & Fias, 2011).
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Similarly striking as the FRN effects, a P300 effect (larger
for negative than for positive feedback) was found to be
significant in the cooperation context only, and its magnitude
correlated with PT across participants. This modulation of the
P300 by the valence and social context of feedback is unlikely
to be caused by a simple oddball effect (Duncan-Johnson &
Donchin, 1977; Squires, Squires, & Hillyard, 1975), since we
collected a larger number of slow than of fast hits, leading to a
slightly higher frequency of negative than of positive feed-
back. Hence, if this P300 effect merely reflected the detection
of rare/deviant events, this component should be larger for
positive than for negative feedback, which is exactly the
opposite of what we have found. Instead, we surmise that this
P300 effect might at least partly relate to the emotional and/or
social impact of negative feedback for the player (Yeung &
Sanfey, 2004), in keeping with its significant correlation with
the PT scale. Indeed, in the cooperative context, being slow
could affect the team performance (and payoff for both par-
ticipants), such that negative feedback (for the player) might
evoke negative social emotions such as guilt or shame, espe-
cially for participants who tend to take the perspective of the
other person into account (for relationships between guilt and
measures of empathy and perspective taking, see Tangney,
1991). The sources of this component in the dACC and
bilateral anterior insula, as well as other prefrontal regions,
accord well with previous results for error- and feedback-
related activations in fMRI (for reviews, see Klein et al.,
2007; Taylor, Stern, & Gehring, 2007). Especially, the anterior
insula has been related to error awareness (Klein et al., 2007;
Ullsperger, Harsay, Wessel, & Ridderinkhof, 2010), but given
its role in emotion processing and interoception (Critchley,
Wiens, Rotshtein, Ohman, & Dolan, 2004; Singer, Critchley,
& Preuschoff, 2009), it might also be involved in the affective
evaluation of negative performance outcomes (Brass &
Haggard, 2010). However, since we had no a priori prediction
about P300, our interpretation of this effect remains tentative.
Further ERP research is needed to corroborate these conclu-
sions and verify whether variations of the P300 and activa-
tions in the anterior insula might index the subjective
experience of social and self-evaluative emotions when pro-
cessing negative feedback in (cooperative) social context
during other experimental paradigms.
Importantly, we note that social context effects were not
observed during the response-locked action monitoring in
the player (Koban et al., 2010), since neither ERN nor Pe
amplitudes were significantly different between cooperation
and competition. This points to a dissociation between error
and feedback monitoring, which are based on different types
of information (internal motor representation vs. external
visual feedback). The input from different sensory or motor
areas may lead to similar prediction error signals, but subse-
quent evaluation processes might integrate additional signals
from social or motivational context.
Our fourth and last prediction concerned the effect of
social context on the observer when processing feedback
information about the other person’s performance. On the
basis of previous findings (Itagaki & Katayama, 2008;
Marco-Pallares et al., 2010), we expected opposite FRN
effects for cooperation versus competition—that is, a classic
oFRN to negative feedback during cooperation but a greater
response to positive feedback during competition. However,
our results did not fulfill this prediction. The oFRN ampli-
tude was enhanced when observing negative versus positive
outcomes in both the cooperators and competitors (although
this effect was smaller in the latter). Furthermore, neural
activity extracted from source ROIs appeared very similar in
both feedback conditions for the observers, despite changes
in topography across social contexts. These findings therefore
suggest that the oFRN was primarily sensitive to negative
outcomes, irrespective of the social relationships between
partners, or to feedback cues as an action error signal, rather
than a reward error signal (de Bruijn et al., 2009). However,
given changes in topography, we cannot entirely rule out the
possibility that neural activity partly differed between these
two social contexts in brain regions that were not included in
our ROI analysis.
This divergent finding for oFRN across studies is likely
explained by differences in the task and experimental set-
tings. In particular, it seems to accord with recent hypothe-
ses (Fukushima & Hiraki, 2006; Marco-Pallares et al., 2010)
suggesting that two different processes might lead to the
generation of an oFRN and influence the direction of its
amplitude changes: a first mechanism based on the evaluation
of outcome for oneself, and a second simulation or mirroring
mechanism based on the observed action outcome. Some
evidence for two separate mechanisms involved in action
outcome observation comes from the fMRI study by de Bruijn
et al. (2009), who showed dissociable reward- versus error-
related signals. Striatal reward versus medial prefrontal error
detection mechanisms could be differentially recruited
depending on task (e.g., gambling vs. performance-based
feedback) and social context (e.g., computer vs. real human
opponent, familiarity, and spatial proximity of participants,
etc.). For instance, in the study by Itagaki and Katayama
(2008), participants played against a virtual partner, whereas
here we invited 2 participants who had to sit next to each other
during the whole experiment, a procedure that should enhance
the attribution of agency and simulation processes. In another
study (Marco-Pallares et al., 2010), participants who did not
know each other were assigned to a fixed role of being either
the performer or the observer, whereas our participants
switched between these two roles several times, which might
also promote PT or simulation processes. Taken together,
these differences might account for a stronger contribution
of action simulation but a weaker contribution of self- and
reward-centered appraisal to the oFRN.
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Another important consideration that could account for
divergent findings between studies concerns a crucial dif-
ference between gambling outcomes and performance feed-
back (as obtained during our go/no-go task, for example).
Here, feedback was based on a continuous adjustment of
criteria directly reflecting individual performance, including
moment-to-moment fluctuations, such that it really provided
relevant information about optimal/desired response speed.
In the case of random gains or losses (gambling; see, e.g.,
Itagaki & Katayama 2008), the outcome is not really con-
trollable by the participant, even if it depends on a self-
generated action (e.g., choice between two boxes). In con-
trast, performance feedback provided during simple RT
tasks not only may reflect positive or negative outcomes
(like losing or winning point), but additionally may incor-
porate information about actual performance and goals and,
thus, have implications for motivating behavioral adjust-
ments (as evidenced by the trial-by-trial changes in RTs).
Therefore, it is likely that the monitoring of gambling versus
performance outcome may at least partly diverge (Elliott,
Frith, & Dolan, 1997), especially in their relative recruit-
ment of action- and reward-monitoring systems (de Bruijn,
et al., 2009). It would be interesting to test more directly in
future work whether ERP correlates of performance moni-
toring (FRN and oFRN) may differ between these two
different task settings (gambling vs. performance outcome).
Finally, we note that our crossed factorial design com-
paring competition versus cooperation did not include a
neutral control condition—for example, with a noninterac-
tive context. Although this might potentially make it diffi-
cult to attribute some effects to competition or cooperation
specifically, our primary aim was to compare these two
conditions as opposite points along the same continuum of
outcome-monitoring processes reflected by the FRN and
oFRN. Moreover, whereas a control condition with a single
player performing alone would be easy to implement, a
noninteractive observer condition might be harder to construct
without confound in attention and motivation. Nevertheless,
future research should further explore neural processes that
might be uniquely or commonly engaged in these different
social contexts, relative to nonsocial situations.
Conclusions
The aim of our study was to investigate the influence of
personal relevance (based on internal prediction and agency),
as well as social relevance, on the neural response to feedback
about actions produced by oneself or others. We show that the
generation of both FRN and oFRN depends on whether the
feedback is relevant—that is, contains new information about
the adequacy of the just performed action. In addition, the
FRN amplitude is larger than the oFRN, due to the increased
personal relevance of own feedback and/or to qualitative
changes in the configuration of the underlying neural gener-
ators (FRN vs. oFRN), as suggested by topographical analy-
ses and source estimations. Furthermore, contrary to the ERN
and Pe, the FRN and P300 amplitudes to own feedback and its
topography are modulated by social context, with larger
responses for cooperators than for competitors. Negative feed-
back leads to speeding-up in following trials, which confirms
that this external information was indeed relevant to adjust
behavior and effort. Although the adjustment in RTs was
similar across contexts, we suggest that the negative feedback
has an increased motivational impact or social relevance for
players during cooperation, because negative outcomes may
decrease the team’s performance and evoke negative self-
conscious emotions such as guilt or shame. Consistent with
this view, we found that this social effect is more pronounced
for individuals with higher PT abilities. By contrast, observers
showed an oFRN to negative, as compared with positive,
feedback that was similar across both social contexts, which
might reflect a predominant recruitment of simulation pro-
cesses, rather than self-centered evaluations regarding the
reward value of action outcomes for the observer. Taken
together, these results highlight the important influences of
social and motivational factors on the monitoring of behavior,
for both self-generated and other-generated actions, and pro-
vide new insights into their underlying neural substrates.
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